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CHOICE OF LAW IN FEDERAL COURT AFTER
TRANSFER OF VENUE
After a transfer of venue from one federal court to another
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),' § 1406(a),2 or § 140 7 (a),3 the first question confronting the new forum is often whether to apply its own
law or that of the transferor court. 4 Prior to 1964, the courts had
split over the proper resolution of this problem. 5 Then, in Van
Dusen v. Barrack,6 the United States Supreme Court provided a
partial answer. Van Dusen held that when a defendant obtains a
128 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district
or division where it might have been brought."
2 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1970) provides: "The district court of a district in which is filed
a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest
of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been
brought."
3 28 U.S.C. § 140 7 (a) (1970) provides in part: "When civil actions involving one or
more common questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be
transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings."
4 The problem of choice of law after transfer of venue can arise with respect to both
state and federal law. A federal court in a diversity case normally follows the conflict-of-law
rules of the state in which it sits. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,
496 (1941). Consequently, after a transfer of venue, a choice-of-law problem exists if the
courts of the transferee and transferor states, under their respective conflict-of-law rules,
would apply different laws. Similar problems can arise even in a non-diversity case, where
the claim arises under federal law, since some issues, such as the statute of limitations, may
be governed by state law. See, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974);
Corey v. Bache & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.W. Va. 1973); Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co.,
59 F.R.D. 44 (S.D. Iowa 1973). A choice-of-law problem concerning federal law will arise
after transfer only if the transferee court's interpretation of federal law differs from that
prevailing in the transferor court. Problems of this sortb ypically come up in multidistrict
litigation after transfer under § 1407. See note 27 infra."t
5 Some courts applied the law of the transferor forum. E.g., H.L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650, 653 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963); Headrick v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 182 F.2d 305, 309-10 (10th Cir. 1950). Others applied the law of
the transferee forum. E.g., Reynolds v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 185 F.2d 27, 29 (7th Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 947 (1951); Jozwiak v. Dayton Oil Co., 200 F. Supp. 300, 302
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); McGee v. Southern Pac. Co., 151 F. Supp. 338, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). A
few courts required, as a condition of transfer, that the moving party stipulate that the law
of the transferor would govern. E.g., Hokanson v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 177 F. Supp.
701 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Frechoux v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 118 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
See generally Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 405 (1955);
Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 341 (1960);
Note, Section 1404(a) and Transfers of Substantive Law, 60 YALE L.J. 537 (1951).
6 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
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transfer under section 1404(a), the transferee court is "obligated to
apply the state law that would have been applied if there had been
no change of venue."'7 The Van Dusen opinion, however, did not
purport to be exhaustive.8 For example, the Court expressly left
open the question of choice of law where plaintiffs seek transfer, 9
and did not address the problem of applicable law after transfers
under sections 1406(a) and 1407(a).
Two principal factors provide an analytic framework for examining the choice-of-law issue that arises after a transfer of venue:
(1) the propriety of the initial forum under federal law with respect
to venue and personal jurisdiction,' ° and (2) the identity of the
party seeking transfer. The American Law Institute (ALI), in its
proposed revision of the Judicial Code," suggests that the choice2
of law should depend entirely on which party moved for transfer.'
7Id. at 639.
8 "[W]e do not and need not consider whether in all cases § 1404(a) would require the
application of the law of the transferor, as opposed to the transferee, State." Id.
9Id. at 640. The Court also left open the choice-of-law issue in cases where the courts
of the state in which the transferor court was located would have dismissed the action on
the ground of forum non conveniens. Id. See note 27 infra.
15 The distinction between transfers from proper and improper forums is analogous to
the distinction between the two principal transfer statutes-§§ 1404(a) and 1406(a). These
statutes are set out in notes I & 2 supra. Although § 1406(a) refers to cases "laying venue
in the wrong division or district," § 1404(a) makes .no such distinction; some courts have
therefore stated that § 1404(a) should be used when venue is proper, and that § 1406(a)
should be used when venue is improper. See, e.g., Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 634
(1964). Many courts, however, have blurred this distinction. Some have permitted transfers
under § 1406(a) where venue in the first forum was proper but personal jurisdiction was
lacking. E.g., Dubin v. United States, 380 F.2d 813, 815 (5th Cir. 1967); Ferguson v.
Kwik-Chek, Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 78, 80 (D.V.I. 1970). A few courts have
permitted transfers under § 1404(a) where venue in the first forum was improper. E.g.,
Patin v. Sioux City and New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 984, 986-87 (W.D.
La. 1966).
11 ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS

(1969) [hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY]. The revisions proposed in the ALl Study were
introduced in the Senate in 1971 (S.1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 15071
(1971)), and were reintroduced in 1973 (S.1876, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., 119 CONG. REC.
16658 (1973)). Although the bill was not reintroduced in the 94th Congress, the Chief
Counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery has stated
that he is "sure that this legislation will be considered in a future Congress." Letter from
William P. Westphal to W. Ray Forrester (Sept. 7, 1976) (on file at the Cornell Law Review). See generally Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (pts. 1-2), 36
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 268 (1968-1969); Field,Jurisdictionof Federal Courts-A Summary of American Law InstituteProposals, 46 F.R.D. 141 (1969).
12Section 1305 of the proposed revision deals with transfers on motion of the defendant, and provides:
To the extent that the court ordering the transfer would have been obliged to
apply the law of a particular State, including rules with respect to refusal to adjudicate the merits of the controversy and rules for selecting the applicable rules
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The ALl Study codifies the Van Dusen rule for cases transferred
upon defendants' motions,' 3 but applies the law of the transferee
court to plaintiff-transferred actions.' 4 This Note examines judicial
treatment of the issue since Van Dusen, demonstrates that the ALI
Study has oversimplified the problem, and proposes a rule based
solely on the propriety of the initial forum.
I
TRANSFER FROM A PROPER FORUM

Cases in which the transferor forum was proper under federal
law with respect to both venue and personal jurisdiction divide into
three categories: (1) cases in which the defendant moved for transfer, (2) cases in which the plaintiff moved for transfer, and (3)
cases in which both parties or the court itself initiated transfer.
A.

Transfer on Defendant's Motion

When a defendant moves for transfer of venue, the case falls
within the rule of Van Dusen v. Barrack.15 Van Dusen arose out of
the crash of a commercial airliner in Massachusetts. Although most
of the plaintiffs in the resulting personal injury and wrongful
death actions brought suit in that state, many plaintiffs, including
Barrack, sued in federal court in Pennsylvania.' 6 The defendants
moved under section 1404(a) for a transfer of venue to the federal
district court in Massachusetts. The plaintiffs argued, however,
that a transfer to Massachusetts could subject them to a prejudicial
of decision, the court to which the action is transferred shall apply the law of that
State.
ALI STUDY, supra note 11, § 1305(c) (emphasis added). Section 1306 deals with transfers on
motion of the plaintiff:
To the extent that a district court is obliged to apply the law of a particular
State, including rules with respect to refusal to adjudicate the merits of a controversy and rules for selecting the applicable rule of decision, the court to which
an action is transferred under this section shall apply the same law that it would have
applied had the action been commenced in that court.
Id. § 1306(c) (emphasis added). Under these proposals, the choice of law after transfer
would depend solely on whether the plaintiff or the defendant moved for transfer, regardless of the propriety of the initial forum. See id. § 1306 note; Currie, supra note 11, pt. 2, at
310.
13 ALl STUDY, supra note 11, § 1305(c) & note.
14 Id. § 1306(c).
15 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
1
See Popkin v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 426, 427 & n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
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change of applicable state law, 1 7 since Pennsylvania's conflict-of-law
18
rules might require the application of Pennsylvania law.
In determining whether the Massachusetts district court would
be bound by Pennsylvania's conflict rules, the Supreme Court pursued three lines of analysis. First, the legislative history of section
1404(a) showed that the statute's purpose was to promote
convenience;' 9 Congress designed section 1404(a) to be "a federal
judicial housekeeping measure,' 20 not a vehicle for effecting
changes in applicable substantive law. Second, the possibility of a
change of law could turn the transfer device into a "forumshopping instrument."'' 2 Finally, because of the policies underlying
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 22 "the 'accident' of federal diversity jurisdiction [should] not enable a party to utilize a transfer to achieve a
result in federal court which could not have been achieved in the
courts of the State where the action was filed. 12 3 The Court con17376 U.S. at 626. Under Massachusetts law, damages for wrongful death were based
on the degree of the defendant's culpability and were limited to $20,000. Under Pennsylvania
law, damages were based on the principle of compensation rather than on culpability and
were not limited in amount. Id. at 627.
18 Id.at 628-29.
The district court granted the defendant's motion, and ordered the actions transferred
to the District of Massachusetts. Popkin v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 426, 428
(E.D. Pa. 1962). The plaintiffs then sought a writ of mandamus to compel the district
judge to vacate his order. The Third Circuit granted the writ on the ground that, since the
plaintiffs had not qualified under Massachusetts law to sue as personal representatives of
the decedents, the transferee district was not one where the action "might have been
brought" within the meaning of § 1404(a). Barrack v. Van Dusen, 309 F.2d 953, 957-58
(3d Cir. 1962). The Supreme Court held, however, that the phrase "where it might have
been brought" must be construed according to federal law; a state law concerning capacity
to sue could not prevent transfer of venue. 376 U.S. at 624-25.
19The Court determined that
[c]ongress, in passing § 1404(a), was primarily concerned with the problems arising where, despite the propriety of the plaintiff's venue selection, the chosen
forum was an inconvenient one.
• . . This legislative background supports the view that [the purpose of
§ 1404(a)] was simply to counteract the inconveniences that flowed from the venue
statutes by permitting transfer to a convenient federal court.
376 U.S.
at 634-35 (emphasis added).
20
d. at 636.
21Id.

22 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Van Dusen Court viewed uniformity of results between

federal and state courts as the principal policy underlying Erie: "[Flor the same transaction
the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a State court
a block away should not lead to a substantially different result." 376 U.S. at 638 (quoting
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945)).
23 376 U.S. at 638. "[T]he critical identity to be maintained is between the federal
district court which decides the case and the courts of the State in which the action was
filed." Id. at 639.
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cluded that a transfer under section 1404(a) should not defeat the
state-law advantages that a plaintiff may obtain through his choice
of forum, 2 4 and that litigants should not receive "a change of law as

a bonus for a change of venue." 2 5 Therefore, "where the defendants seek transfer, the transferee district court must be obligated
to apply the state law that would have been applied if there had
been no change of venue. A change of venue under § 1404(a)
generally should be, with respect to state law, but a change of
courtrooms.

26

The Supreme Court thus settled the question of choice of law
after transfer from a proper forum on defendant's motion. Courts

subsequently facing the problem have uniformly
followed Van
27
forum.
transferor
the
of
law
the
Dusen, applying
24

Id. at 635.
25Id. at 636 n.33 (quoting Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 522 (1953) (dissenting opinion, Jackson, J.)).
26 376 U.S. at 639. The Court nevertheless held that the transferee court "may apply
its own rules governing the conduct and dispatch of cases in its court." Id. at 639 n.40. See
Ryer v. Harrisburg Kohl Bros., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 404, 408 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (transferee court
need not follow transferor's local pleading rules).
27 Some courts have applied the law of the transferor forum on the ground that the
transferor state's conflict rules required this. E.g., Glick v. White Motor Co., 458 F.2d
1287, 1293 (3d Cir. 1972) (award of pre-judgment interest); Kane v. Hallmark Ins. Co.,
409 F. Supp. 467, 468-69 (S.D. Fla. 1976) (breach of contract); Burger King Corp. v.
Continental Ins. Co., 359 F. Supp. 184, 187-88 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (validity of contractual
clause barring suits after stated time period); Morganstern v. Marriott-Hot Shoppes, Inc.,
270 F. Supp. 75, 77 (D. Md. 1967) (statute of limitations). See Lehtonen v. E.I. DuPont
DeNemours & Co., 389 F. Supp. 633, 634 (D. Mont. 1975) (dictum) ("procedural law");
Maxlow v. Leighton, 325 F. Supp. 913, 914 (E.D. Pa. 1971). Some cases have applied the
law of the transferor state without specifically discussing the conflict-of-law problem.
Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 759 (5th Cir. 1974) (statute of limitations); Carr v.
American Universal Ins. Co., 341 F.2d 220, 225 (6th Cir. 1965) (award of attorney's fees);
Construction Aggregates Corp. v. S.S. Azalea City, 399 F. Supp. 662, 664-65 (D.N.J. 1975)
(admiralty); Kend v. Chroma-Glo, Inc., 51 F.R.D. 547, 549 (D. Minn. 1970) (burden of
proof for release of attached funds), aff'd, 478 F.2d 198 (8th Cir. 1973); Ryer v. Harrisburg Kohl Bros., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 7, 9 (M.D. Pa. 1970) (right to implead joint tortfeasors;
right to inform jury that defendant insured). See Kisko v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 408 F.
Supp. 984, 986 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (statute of limitations); Lamb v. United Security Life Co.,
59 F.R.D. 44, 46 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (statute of limitations). In other cases, courts have invoked the conflict rules of the transferor state to apply the law of the transferee. Alabama
Great So. R.R. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 467 F.2d 679, 681 (5th Cir. 1972) (accrual of action);
Glick v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 343 F.2d 839, 842-43 (8th Cir. 1965) (standing to sue;
measure of damages); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 341 F.2d 673,
675 (2d Cir. 1965) (definition of "counterfeit"); Harriman v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 411 F. Supp. 133, 152 (D. Del. 1975) (propriety of corporate merger); Lehtonen v.
E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 389 F. Supp. 633, 634 (D. Mont. 1975) (statute of limitations); Davis v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 400 F. Supp. 1347, 1349 (W.D.N.C. 1974)
(statute of limitations; accrual of action). In at least one case the conflict rules of the trans-
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Transfer on Plaintiff's Motion

When a plaintiff who has filed suit in a proper forum moves
for a transfer of venue, the choice-of-law problem becomes more
difficult. The Van Dusen Court expressly left this issue open, 2 8 and
the lower courts have divided over its proper resolution. 2 9 The
feror court required the transferee court to apply the law of a foreign country. See Quandt
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1009, 1013 (D. Del. 1970) (negligence).
Courts have extended the Van Dusen principle to cover transfers under section 140 7 (a)
designed to coordinate or consolidate related actions pending in different districts. See 28
U.S.C. § 140 7 (a) (1970), set out in note 3 supra. See, e.g., In re Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp.
732, 749 (C.D. Cal. 1975); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover, N.H., 314 F. Supp. 62,
63 (J.P.M.D.L. 1970). The Van Dusen rule has also been applied where the courts of the
transferor state would have dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens. In In re Air
Crash Disaster at Boston, Mass., 399 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Mass. 1975), the court held that
the law of the transferor state governed, although a court of the transferor state had in
fact dismissed plaintiff's action on the ground of forum non conveniens. Id. at 1122. See
Caffrey, The Role of the Transferee Judge in Multi-district Litigation, 69 F.R.D. 289, 294-97
(1976).
Some courts have extended the Van Dusen result to issues governed by federal law. For
example, in In re Plumbing Fixtures Litigation, 342 F. Supp. 756 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972), an
antitrust action filed by the State of North Carolina was transferred to a district where
related actions were pending. The State opposed the transfer on the ground that the
transferee circuit's interpretation of 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), the antitrust provision dealing
with standing to sue for treble damages, was less favorable to plaintiffs than the interpretation of the transferor circuit. The court held that under Van Dusen the law of the transferor circuit would govern after transfer. 342 F. Supp. at 758. Accord, Berry Petroleum Co.
v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1975); Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American
Radiator & Std. Sanitary Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1053, 1055 (E.D. Pa. 1969). See In re Air
Crash Disaster at Boston, Mass., 399 F. Supp. 1106, 1108 (D. Mass. 1975). But cf. H.L.
Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1962) (dictum) (plaintiff may not
resist transfer on ground that transferee court will interpret federal law less favorably for
him), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963); Ryer v. Harrisburg Kohl Bros., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 404,
408 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (transferee court need not follow transferor's local pleading rules).
The question of applicability of the Van Dusen principle to transfers under § 1406
generally will not arise in the proper-forum context since § 1406, by its own terms, applies
only to transfer from improper forums. See note 2 supra. But see note 10 supra.
28 376 U.S. at 640.

29 Most of these cases involve disputes over the applicable statute of limitations. Typically, a plaintiff commences an action in a forum where the statute of limitations has already run, and then seeks to transfer venue to a forum with a more favorable statute.
Compare Schenk v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 377 F. Supp. 477, 480 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (transferor
law applied), aff'd mem., 521 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1975), and Hargrove v. Louisville &
N.R.R., 153 F. Supp. 681, 684 (W.D. Ky. 1957) (transferor law applied), with Watwood v.
Barber, 70 F.R.D. 1, 5 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (transferee law applied), and Les Schwimley Motors,
Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 418, 420-21 (E.D. Cal. 1967) (transferee law
applied) (citing ALI STUDY, supra note 11).
Kline v. Wheels by Kinney, Inc., 464 F.2d 184, 185 (4th Cir. 1972), is the only reported case in which a plaintiff moved for transfer from a proper forum for reasons other
than the statute of limitations. The Kline court, in applying transferor law on tort liability
of an absent automobile owner, merely cited Van Dusen, apparently overlooking the distinc-
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ALI proposes that the law of the transferee forum should govern
after a transfer on plaintiff's motion, regardless of whether the
initial forum was proper.3 0 Under this proposal, the solution to the
choice-of-law problem depends entirely upon whether the plaintiff
or the defendant initiated the transfer. 3 1 The purpose of this distinction is to prevent plaintiffs from using transfers to carry favorable law from one forum to another. 32 Thus the ALI, like the Van
Dusen Court, wishes to prevent forum shopping. Unfortunately,
although applying the law of the transferee makes sense after a
transfer from an improper forum,3 3 the ALI rule will not prevent
forum shopping where the plaintiff's original choice of forum was
proper.
Analysis of the ALL rule requires a close look at the meaning
of "forum shopping." Plaintiffs engage in the simplest kind of
forum shopping when they initially select forums with favorable
laws. The Van Dusen Court did not intend to proscribe this practice; indeed, the Court sought to protect advantages obtained by
the plaintiff through his choice of forum, even if that forum was
inconvenient. 34 The Court in Van Dusen sought to prevent only
forum shopping accomplished by transfer of venue.3 5 Parties can
use transfer of venue as a forum-shopping device in two ways.
First, a party dissatisfied with the law of the original forum may
attempt to achieve a favorable change of law by transferring to
another forum, and hoping that the law of the transferee will govern. Van Dusen prevents use of this tactic by defendants. 36 Second,
a party may intentionally select a forum with favorable law in the
hope of transporting that law to a more convenient forum. The
tion between motions by plaintiffs and motions by defendants. Indeed, the court's opinion
does not even mention which party had moved for transfer, although correspondence with
counsel has confirmed that the motion was made by the plaintiff. Letter from Judge John

W. Winston, former partner of Seawell, McCoy, Winston & Dalton, to John D. Currivan
(Sept. 21, 1976) (on file at the Cornell Law Review).
30 ALI STUDY, supra note 11, § 1306(c). See note 12 supra.

31 Compare ALI STUDY, supra note 11, § 1305(c), with id. § 1306(c).
32 According to the commentary in the ALI Study, a defendant "ought not by resort to
the transfer device to be able to frustrate any choice-of-law advantage which the plaintiff
might gain from his choice of forum." ALI STUDY, supra note 11, at 155. But when a
plaintiff moves for transfer, "he ought not to carry with him the choice-of-law advantage

resulting from his initial choice of forum." Id. See Field, supra note 11, at 146.
33 See text accompanying notes 56-57 infra.
34 376 U.S. at 633-35.
35 "If a change of law were in the offing, the parties might well regard [§ 1404(a)]
primarily as a forum-shopping instrument." Id. at 636.
36 See text accompanying note 26 supra.
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ALI rule seeks to prevent plaintiffs from using this tactic by apply3 7
ing the law of the transferee.
The ALI thus bases its rule on two assumptions: first, that
plaintiffs will attempt to use the second tactic rather than the
first-transporting, rather than changing, the applicable law; and
second, that application of the law of the transferee will prevent
plaintiffs from transporting favorable law to more convenient
forums. 38 Both of these assumptions are questionable. The first
envisions a clever plaintiff who, with premeditated cunning, plans
to file in the most favorable forum and then to transfer to the most
convenient one; it overlooks the blundering plaintiff who chooses a
forum with unfavorable law and hopes to use the transfer to rectify
his error. If this assumption were correct, plaintiffs would presumably argue for the law of the transferor. In the few reported cases
where plaintiffs moved for transfer from proper forums, however,
the defendants argued for the law of the transferor. 39 This suggests that plaintiff-transferors often blunder in selecting an initial
forum. In these cases, the ALI rule would encourage use of the
transfer as a forum-shopping device. The ALI's second assumption
is even more questionable; application of the law of the transferee
will seldom prevent the clever plaintiff from transporting favorable
law to a more convenient forum. The plaintiff can achieve this goal
by filing his action in a favorable but inconvenient forum, and then
waiting for the defendant to move for transfer. 40 The plaintiff can
be reasonably certain that the defendant will make such a motion,
since transfer will deprive the defendant of nothing, but will provide him with a more convenient courthouse. 4 '
3 See note 32 supra.
38 Because the outcome under the ALI rule turns on whether the plaintiff or the

defendant initiated the transfer, a third assumption implicit in the rule is that in each case
only one party will move for transfer. At times, however, both parties, or the court itself,
may initiate a transfer. See text accompanying notes 49-54 infra.
39 See note 29 supra.
40 Burger King Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co., 359 F. Supp. 184 (W.D. Pa. 1973), illustrates the use of this strategy. In Burger King, an insurance contract covering a Pennsylvania restaurant contained a clause purporting to bar suits commenced more than one year
after a loss. This clause would have been valid under Pennsylvania law, but was invalid
under Florida law. Eighteen months after the restaurant was damaged, plaintiff, a Florida
corporation, commenced an action in a Florida state court. The defendant removed the
action to federal court, transferred venue to the Western District of Pennsylvania under
§ 1404(a), and moved for summary judgment on the basis of the one-year limitation clause.
The court held that the conflict rule of the transferor court governed. Since Florida courts
would apply Florida law, the clause was invalid. Id. at 186-88.
41 See In re Air Crash Disaster at Boston, Mass., 399 F. Supp. 1106, 1122 (D. Mass.
1975). It is possible, of course, that a transferee forum convenient for the plaintiff will be
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In lieu of adopting the ALI proposal, courts should extend the
Van Dusen holding to transfers by plaintiffs from proper forums.
This solution would require the transferee court to apply the law
of the forum first chosen by the plaintiff. The rule would not
encourage forum shopping; it would merely enable plaintiffs wishing to transport favorable law to do directly what they can now
accomplish indirectly. The rule would also prevent the blundering
plaintiff who hoped to effect a favorable change of law from using
the transfer as a forum-shopping device.
Moreover, applying the law of the transferor conforms with
the other policies expressed in Van Dusen. Section 1404(a) was intended to promote the convenience of parties and not to affect
substantive law. 42 When a plaintiff chooses a proper forum with
favorable law, he gains an advantage to which he is entitled. 43 If he
is permitted to transport that law to a more convenient forum, his
use of the transfer merely promotes convenience without affecting
substantive law. When a plaintiff attempts to use the transfer to
effect a favorable change in substantive law, applying the law of the
transferor will prevent him from obtaining "a change of law as a
bonus for a change of venue. '4 4 This solution also reflects the
policies of Erie emphasized in Van Dusen;45 the plaintiff is unable to
achieve "a result in federal court which could not have been
inconvenient for the defendant. One might argue that because the plaintiff cannot rely on
the defendant to move for transfer to such a forum, the application of transferee law
under the ALl rule does prevent the plaintiff from transporting favorable law to a forum
that is convenient only for him, and that the application of transferor law would therefore
encourage forum shopping. The language of § 1404(a), however, indicates that transfer is
granted not merely for the convenience of the moving party, but for the convenience of
"parties and witnesses." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970). In such a case, therefore, the transferor court would probably not grant the plaintiff's motion for transfer. Thus, the cases in
which a plaintiff cannot rely on the defendant to move for transfer are likely to be cases
where the plaintiff's own transfer motion would fail. Exceptional situations may arise in
which a defendant may decide, for reasons other than convenience, not to move for transfer to a more convenient forum. For example, if a poor plaintiff sues a rich defendant in
an inconvenient forum with favorable law, the defendant may wish to remain in that
forum in the hope that the expense of litigation will encourage the plaintiff to settle for a
small sum. In such a case the second ALl assumption is realistic: the application of transferee law will prevent the poor plaintiff from transporting favorable law to the more convenient forum. On the other hand, the ALI rule, by effectively preventing transfer by the
plaintiff, tends to frustrate the purpose of § 1404(a) by allowing the defendant to take
advantage of his wealth at the expense of the convenience of parties and witnesses.
42 See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
43 See text accompanying note 34 supra.
" Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636 (1964) (quoting Wells v. Simonds Abrasive
Co., 345 U.S. 514, 522 (1953) (dissenting opinion, Jackson, J.)).
'5 For a discussion of these policies, see notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:149

achieved in the courts of the State where the action was filed. ' 4 6
Where a clever plaintiff wishes to transport favorable law to a
convenient forum, application of the law of the transferor would
produce the same result as a suit prosecuted in the courts of the
transferor state. The blundering plaintiff wishing to effect a favorable change of law would be unable to use the transfer to obtain an
advantage he could not have obtained in the courts of the transferor state.4 7 In the spirit of Erie, this solution thus maintains the
"critical identity . . . between the federal district court which decides the case and the courts of the State in which the action was
filed."

C.

48

Transfer Initiated by Both Parties or by the Court

Not all transfers of venue are initiated by the motion of one
party. The parties may make a joint motion for a transfer, or may
stipulate to a change of locale; 49 sometimes the court itself may
initiate 50 or suggest 51 a transfer. In all these cases courts have uni52
formly applied the law of the transferor.
The ALI rule, under which the outcome depends on the identity of the moving party, 5 3 does not solve the choice-of-law problem
'6 376 U.S. at 638.
47 The plaintiff's opportunity to rectify an error in forum selection by means other
than transfer also corresponds to the opportunity available to plaintiffs in state court systems. If the statute of limitations of the second state has not yet run, the plaintiff can take
advantage of the second state's more favorable law by. filing a new action in federal court
in that state.
48Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. at 639.
49
See, e.g., Yoder v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1084, 1085 (E.D. Pa. 1971);
Hargrove v. Louisville & N.R.R., 153 F. Supp. 681, 682 (W.D. Ky. 1957).
50 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c) (1970) provides in part: "Proceedings for the transfer of an
action under this section may be initiated by-(i) the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation upon its own initiative .... " Unlike § 1407, § 1404 does not explicitly authorize a
court to transfer venue without the motion of a party. See note 1 supra. The court in
Stanley Works v. Globemaster, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 1325, 1338 (D. Mass. 1975), nevertheless
construed § 1404(a) to permit such a transfer. Cf. I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co. v. Becker, 343
F.2d 361, 363 (8th Cir. 1965) (dictum) (unlike § 1404(b), § 1404(a) contains no language
limiting district court's power to transfer).
-' See Bott v. American Hydrocarbon Corp., 441 F.2d 896, 898 (5th Cir. 1971).
52 E.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Boston, Mass., 399 F. Supp. 1106, 1122 (D. Mass.
1975); In re Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 732, 749 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (transfer under
§ 1407); Yoder v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1084, 1086 (E.D. Pa. 1971); In re Air
Crash Disaster Near Hanover, N.H., 314 F. Supp. 62, 63 (J.P.M.D.L. 1970) (transfer under
§ 1407). See Bott v. American Hydrocarbon Corp., 441 F.2d 896, 899 (5th Cir. 1971);
Junco v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 666, 666 n.* (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (dictum), aff'd,
538 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1976).
3
See notes 11-14 and accompanying text supra.
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posed by these cases. Nonetheless, the ALl rule would seriously
affect the number of requests-both individual and mutual-for
transfer of venue. Consider the case in which the plaintiff chooses
a forum with favorable law in the hope of transporting that law to
a more convenient forum. Under the ALI rule, if the plaintiff
moves for transfer, the law applied in the second forum will benefit the defendant; if the defendant moves for transfer, the law
applied in the second forum will benefit the plaintiff. Thus, each
party will have an incentive to wait for the other to move. This
state of affairs would do little to promote the goal of "convenience
of parties and witnesses. ' 54 The ALI proposal raises an even more
serious problem when the plaintiff chooses a forum with unfavorable law, and later wants to correct his error. Under the ALI rule, if
the plaintiff moves for transfer and the defendant does not, the
law applied in the second forum will benefit the plaintiff; if the
defendant moves for transfer and the plaintiff does not, the law
applied in the second forum will benefit the defendant. Thus, if
only one party moves, that party will gain a choice-of-law advantage. Consequently, both parties will move for transfer. The ALI
rule therefore encourages the parties to create a situation for
which it provides no solution.
In short, the ALI rule creates more problems than it solves. A
more sensible approach would be to apply the law of the transferor
regardless of who initiated the transfer. A party would then have
no incentive to refrain from moving in the hope that his opponent
would move; nor would any party be compelled to move in order
to prevent his opponent from gaining a choice-of-law advantage.
Convenience, rather than a desire to manipulate substantive law,
would constitute the sole incentive for motions to transfer from
proper forums. Moreover, court-ordered transfers would pose no
special problems. Such transfers are not covered by the ALI's
party-based proposal, but they fit neatly into a choice-of-law rule
looking solely to the propriety of the initial forum.
II
TRANSFER FROM AN IMPROPER FORUM
When a plaintiff files an action in a forum in which venue is
improper or in which the defendant is not subject to personal
5428 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970) (set out in note I supra).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 63:149

jurisdiction, transfer is necessary to avoid dismissal, and is generally initiated by the plaintiff under section 1406(a). 55 Consequently,
under the ALI rule, the law of the transferee would govern after
transfer. 56 This result is desirable in this context for two reasons.
First, it prevents plaintiffs from achieving choice-of-law advantages
to which they would not be entitled without a transfer. 5 7 Second, it
prevents the unlimited forum shopping that the opposite rule
would encourage. If the law of the transferor applied, plaintiffs
could commence actions in any jurisdiction with favorable laws,
and then transport those laws to proper forums. Unlike plaintiffs
who have sought out and sued in proper forums with favorable
laws, plaintiffs in improper forums cannot simply wait for defendants to move for transfer to more convenient forums; defendants
will move for dismissal instead.
Most cases dealing with this problem have involved disputes
over the applicable statute of limitations. 58 The cases fall into three
categories: (1) actions filed before the statute of limitations has run
in the first forum, but after the statute has run in the second
forum; (2) actions filed when neither statute has run, but where
the second statute runs before the action is transferred; and (3)
actions filed after the statute in the first forum has run but before
the statute in the second forum has run, and in which a party seeks
a transfer after the running of both statutes.
Cases of the first type present the simplest situation, because
the choice-of-law issue alone is dispositive. Plaintiffs can maintain
their actions in the transferee forum only if the statute of limitations of the transferor governs. These cases also present the
clearest examples of attempts to use the transfer device for forum
shopping. By filing in improper forums, plaintiffs seek to accom51Transfers from improper forums are occasionally initiated by stipulation (e.g.,
Geehan v. Monahan, 382 F.2d 111, 113 (7th Cir. 1967)), or by the court's own motion (e.g.,
Bealle v. Nyden's, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 86, 89 (D. Conn. 1965)). In some cases, plaintiffs have
moved for transfer from improper forums under § 1404(a) instead of § 1406(a). See note
10 supra.
56 ALI STUDY, supra note 11, § 1306(c) (set out in note 12 supra).
57In Van Dusen, where the initial forum was proper, the Court noted that "state-law
advantages . . .might accrue from the exercise of [plaintiff's] venue privilege." 376 U.S. at
635 (emphasis added). However, the notion that a plaintiff who commences an action in
federal court acquires rights to the application of certain state law is unpersuasive in a case
where the plaintiff has chosen a forum that is improper under federal law.
58Only one reported case dealing with transfer from an improper forum squarely
faces the choice-of-law problem with respect to an issue other than the statute of limitations. Geehan v. Monahan, 382 F.2d 111, 114 (7th Cir. 1967) (transferee law held applicable on issues of conflict of laws and res ipsa loquitur).
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plish what they could not have accomplished by suing at the outset
in proper forums. Most courts have correctly held that the applic'able statute of limitations after transfer is that of the transferee. 5 9
The second type of case is complicated by the question of
whether filing in the first forum tolls the statute of limitations of
the second. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an action
commences at the time of filing. 60 If tolling is governed by federal
law, plaintiffs' actions will not be barred regardless of which statute
of limitations applies. If tolling is governed by state law, then
courts may reach the choice-of-law question with respect to the
applicable period of limitations. In other contexts this tolling issue has divided the courts,6 ' but in transfer cases the prevailing
view is that federal law governs, and that filing within the limitation periods of both statutes therefore tolls the statute of the
second forum. 62 Consequently, the choice-of-law issue becomes
63
irrelevant.
59 Carson v. U-Haul Co., 434 F.2d 916, 918 (6th Cir. 1970); Bealle v. Nyden's, Inc.,
245 F. Supp. 86, 89 (D. Conn. 1965); Viaggio v. Field, 177 F. Supp. 643, 647 (D. Md.
1959). See Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 758-59 (5th Cir. 1974) (dictum). But see
Parham v. Edwards, 346 F. Supp. 968, 971 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 470 F.2d 1000
(5th Cir. 1973).
60 FED. R. Civ. P. 3 provides: "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with
the court."
61 In Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1949), a
case not involving transfer of venue, the Supreme Court held that, under the Erie doctrine,
state law dictates when an action is commenced for the purpose of tolling the state's statute
of limitations. In Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-70 (1965), however, the Court held
that the Erie doctrine was not the appropriate test for determining the applicability of a
federal rule. Even where a federal rule "alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights"
(id. at 473), federal courts must apply the rule unless it represents an abuse of the
rulemaking power. Id. at 471. Nevertheless, Hanna did not expressly overrule Ragan, and
the issue remains unresolved. The Second Circuit, for example, has declined to follow
Ragan. Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598, 606 (2d Cir. 1968). The Eighth
Circuit found Ragan still authoritative in Groninger v. Davison, 364 F.2d 638, 642 (8th Cir.
1966), but subsequently limited its application in Prashar v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
480 F.2d 947, 953 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 994 (1974).
62 In Smith v. Peters, 482 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974),
the court held that "the decision as to when the action was commenced determines only
whether the action is to continue; it is purely procedural, and does not relate to the substantive issues of the case." Id. at 801. Accord, Callan v. Lillybelle, Ltd., 39 F.R.D. 600, 603
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). See Carson v. U-Haul Co., 434 F.2d 916, 918 (6th Cir. 1970) (dictum);
Dubin v. United States, 380 F.2d 813, 814-15 (5th Cir. 1967); Tillman v. Eattock, 385 F.
Supp. 625 (D. Kan. 1974); see also Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962) (by implication). Contra, Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653, 656 (8th Cir. 1967). The Mayo court
relied on Groninger, a case whose authority is now questionable. See note 61 supra.
63 However, if a court decides on the basis of either federal or state law that filing in
the first forum does not toll the statute of the second forum, it would then face the choiceof-law issue with regard to the applicable statute of limitations. In this situation, there is
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The most difficult problems stem from the third type of case,
since both choice-of-law and tolling issues come into play. Plaintiffs
can maintain their actions only if the statute of limitations of the
transferee applies and the filing in the first forum tolled that statute. In Ferguson v. Kwik-Chek, Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. ,64 the only
reported case of this type, a Virgin Islands district court resolved
the choice-of-law issue in favor of the plaintiff, and assumed that
the transferee statute was tolled by the original filing. 65 The court
relied primarily on Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heinan,6 6 in which, as in
Ferguson, the transfer of venue was from an improper forum. In
Goldlawr, however, the plaintiff filed the action in the first forum
within the applicable period of limitations, and the Supreme Court
emphasized the plaintiff's diligence in filing. 67 Where such diligence is lacking, as in Ferguson, the use of section 1406(a) to save the
plaintiff's case is beyond the intent of that section. 68 Unlike section
1404(a), which deals with the "convenience of parties and witnesses," 69 section 1406(a) is designed to prevent dismissal in cases
where the plaintiff has made errors related to venue and personal
some support for applying the law of the transferee. See Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d
750, 758-59 (5th Cir. 1974) (dictum); Dewey v. Farchone, 460 F.2d 1338, 1339-40 (7th Cir.
1972) (by implication). But see Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653, 656 (8th Cir. 1967) (dictum). In Mayo, the court did not have to decide which statute of limitations applied, because
the limitation periods were identical. Id. at 656.
64 308 F. Supp. 78 (D.V.I. 1970).
65
d. at 81. In Ferguson, a resident of the Virgin Islands filed an action in the Virgin
Islands federal court against a Florida corporation for injuries sustained in Florida. The
action was filed after the running of the Virgin Islands statute of limitations, but two weeks
before the running of the Florida statute. Facing dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction,
the plaintiff sought transfer to Florida under § 1404(a) after the running of the Florida
statute. The defendant opposed the transfer on the grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction and the running of the Virgin Islands statute of limitations. The court, treating the
motion as if it had been brought under § 1406(a) because of the lack of personal jurisdiction, held that the plaintiff was entitled to transfer: "[T]he fact that the Virgin Islands
statute of limitations had fully run is of no moment, the case having been commenced
within the period of the Florida statue." Id.
66369 U.S. 463 (1962). Goldlawr holds that § 1406(a) permits transfer from a forum
that is improper with respect to both venue and personal jurisdiction. Id. at 465-67.
67 "The filing itself shows the proper diligence on the part of the plaintiff which such
statutes of limitation were intended to insure." Id. at 467.
66
Section 1406, as originally enacted .... was mandatory and required transfer without any consideration of the reason why a case was filed in the wrong
district. By act of May 24, 1949, c. 139, § 81, 63 Stat. 101, the section was
amended to provide transfer in lieu of dismissal only "if it be in the interest of
justice." . .. It is obviously not "in the interest of justice" to allow this section to be
used to aid a non-diligent plaintiff who knowingly files a case in the wrong district.
Dubin v. United States, 380 F.2d 813, 816 n.5 (5th Cir. 1967).
6928 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970) (set out in note 1 supra).
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jurisdiction.7 0 Expansion of this list to include errors related to the
statute of limitations is a change best left to Congress. Moreover,
such an interpretation of section 1406(a) would produce the
anomalous result of placing non-diligent plaintiffs who file in improper forums in a better position than non-diligent plaintiffs who
file in proper forums. 7 1 A preferable rule in cases of this type
would provide that filing in an improper forum after its period of
limitations should not toll the statute of any other forum. This
solution moots the choice-of-law issue, avoids inconsistency with
cases involving proper forums, and carries out the policies behind
section 1406(a).
The foregoing analysis suggests that the law of the transferee
should apply after transfers from improper forums. In addition,
only a timely filing in the first forum should toll the statute of
limitations of the second.
CONCLUSION

Transfer of venue often requires the transferee court to decide whether it must apply the law that the transferor court would
have applied. The American Law Institute has proposed that the
law of the transferor should govern after a transfer on defendant's
motion and that the law of the transferee should govern after a
transfer on plaintiff's motion. Instead, determination of the applicable law should be based on the propriety of venue and personal
jurisdiction in the initial forum. Where the inkial forum is proper,
the law of the transferor should govern; where the initial forum is
improper, the transferee court should be free to apply its own law.
John D. Currivan
70 Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 465-66 (1962).

71 Compare Ferguson v. Kwik-Chek, Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 78, 81 (D.V.I.
1970) (transfer from improper forum), with Schenk v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 377 F. Supp.
477, 480 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (transfer from proper forum), aff'd, 521 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1975).

